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while those who oppose the free market will oppose EU membership.1
We begin the article with a brief review of work on determinants of EU support in both advanced industrial democracies and transitional states, followed by a systematic explication of our model, including our assumptions and hypotheses. We then present empirical tests of our hypotheses utilizing survey data from ten East European countries with methods of analysis that are appropriate to the data. We conclude with implications of our findings for future research.
Determinants of EU Support
The previous decade has produced a burgeoning field of research on the relationship between societal characteris? tics, mass attitudes, and European Union integration in the advanced industrial world (for a range of reviews, see However, the costs associated with membership in the EU are not borne equally among groups in particu? lar societies. In the short run, both workers and owners in specific industries bear the burden of adjustment to lNote the important distinction between this approach and the more traditional "utilitarian" approach used in established democ? racies. We claim that citizens choose to support EU membership not on the basis of how joining the EU will change their economic position in the future as the utilitarian approach posits, but rather because of how their economic position has changed since the transition from communism. We maintain that the utilitarian ap? proach makes unrealistic assumptions about both the stability of post-communist societies and citizens* understanding of the realities of EU membership. Instead, we posit merely that citizens have a sense of whether they are doing well in this new world and whether they would like the new free market economy to continue in the future.
capital mobility during integration. Opportunities exist for those skilled enough to compete with other workers in their occupation throughout the market, while unskilled workers will be at a comparative disadvantage (Gabel 1998a (Gabel , 1998b 6As a robustness test, we also conducted our analyses using an al? ternative survey question as the dependent variable that asked respondents "As you might know, fifteen states of 'Western' Europe form together the 'European Union'. Would you say that your impressions of the aims and activities of the European Union are generally positive, neutral, or negative?" The results presented below were robust to using the alternative measure of attitudes to? wards the EU. 7The question actually had five coded responses, with undecided and don't know/no answer as separate categories. Since the two categories are not very distinct substantively, we collapsed them, but the results are robust to rescaling the variable in its five-category format.
8Slightly fewer than 18 percent of the respondents were coded as "don't know." We reran our analyses including these respondents using a series of dummy variables for the three responses. The re? sults were robust to this respecification. The only additional insight gained is, not surprisingly, that the respondents that failed to an? swer this question also tended towards the "don't know/no answer" and the "would not vote" categories of the dependent variable. l0Respondents were assigned a value on this scale as long as they answered at least one of the two questions. If they answered both questions (92 percent of respondents), the "winner" value was the mean of the two answers. If they answered only one of the two (7 percent), the "winner" value was the value of the one nonmissing response; only 1 percent refused to answer both questions.
nThe excluded variables are residence in a village/rural area, "other" occupation, and income in the third quartile. In two of the single country analyses (Bulgaria and Poland), some ofthe demo? graphic variables predicted categories perfectly, resulting in nonsensical coefficients and standard errors. For these countries, we dropped the variables in question. The key results of interest were robust to these changes. 12Predicted probabilities were calculated using stochastic simulation. Demographic variables were held at their mean, and the explanatory variables were set at the various levels noted in the figures. Reported probabilities are the mean ofthe 1000 simulated predicted probabilities generated by Clarify 1.3 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2000) used in conjunction with Stata 6.0. Regardless of whether or not one supports the free mar? ket, moving from being a loser to a winner has a substantively meaningful effect on the likelihood of supporting the EU in eight out of the ten countries; Table 2 the results are presented in Table 3 . forms across the region.
